An Avicennian Response to the Problem of Evil

By Mohamad Farhat

An examination of Avicenna's response to the problem of evil.

Introduction

If God is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good, why does evil exist? This question represents perhaps the greatest criticism against the existence of God.

In Book IX, Chapter 6 of The Metaphysics of the Healing, Avicenna discusses the issue of evil and the role of divine providence in permitting it. Rather than viewing evil as something that exists independently, Avicenna views evil as the privation of good. I intend to show that Avicenna's response creates a coherent picture of why there is evil in a universe designed and directed by God, though it leaves unanswered a serious objection about suffering that seems to serve no necessary purpose.

Evil as Privation

Avicenna begins by drawing a distinction between evil in itself and evil that happens accidentally. Evil in itself is defined as the lack of a perfection which naturally pertains to a thing. For example, blindness is evil because sight is a perfection which belongs to the nature of certain living beings. A rock, on the other hand, cannot be said to be deprived of sight simply because sight is not part of its nature.

It is important to understand the difference between evil in itself and accidental evil. Fire is not evil by nature. Fire has properties which contribute positively to the natural order. Those same properties, however, can bring about harm when they create suffering and injury to an organism.

Something can thus be good in itself and become evil relative to something else.

The argument can be stated as follows:

  1. Evil in itself is a lack of a perfection which something naturally should have.
  2. Privations do not have independent existence like positive entities.
  3. Therefore, evil in itself is not an independently existing entity created alongside goodness.

This distinction enables Avicenna to hold that God is the source of all existence and goodness without holding that evil is a separately created principle of creation.

On the other hand, the privation theory does not deny that suffering is real. Though suffering is evil due to the loss of a good suitable to an individual, actual suffering, pain and destruction are all genuine experiences.

Divine Providence and the Necessity of Some Evils

Avicenna's answer extends well beyond the nature of evil into why God tolerates evil. Divine providence is described in Book IX, Chapter 6 as God's knowledge of the order of goodness and the existence of that order through divine causality.

As Avicenna points out, many objects in nature contain features that are beneficial, but also capable of causing harm. Fire, for example, produces heat and serves many useful functions, but fire can also burn and destroy. If fire had no capability to burn anything at all, then it would lose much of its function and characteristics. Therefore, eliminating its potential to harm completely would mean either altering or removing the exact qualities which give it value.

Avicenna concludes that the amount of good generated by natural phenomena is far greater than the corresponding evils, and consequently, divine providence needn't eliminate a greater good to avoid a lesser evil.

His reasoning can be put into words as follows:

  1. Natural goods include possible sources of harm.
  2. To remove those sources of harm, one would have to either remove or alter the goods themselves.
  3. God does not have to eliminate a greater good in order to prevent a lesser evil.
  4. Therefore, some evils are permitted by God as part of a natural order which ultimately contains more good than evil.

The central idea is that evil may result incidentally from an otherwise good order. God does not create evil as an end in itself; He permits it because it accompanies the occurrence of greater goods.

Objection from Gratuitous Suffering

One major criticism of Avicenna's explanation relates to whether or not all forms of suffering can be explained through his theory. The above example illustrates how incidental harms may be present in conjunction with inherent benefits. However, it does not demonstrate why suffering must occur due to processes that generate those benefits.

Take a sick child experiencing extreme pain due to an incurable disease. Although that illness was likely produced by natural causes, it is unclear why such suffering is required for a greater good.

The objection can be formulated as follows:

  1. A God who is both perfectly good and omnipotent would prevent all suffering that serves no necessary purpose.
  2. Some instances of suffering appear to serve no necessary purpose.
  3. Therefore, some instances of suffering appear incompatible with the existence of such a God.

The objection is especially forceful because Avicenna's explanation deals with the overall goodness of the cosmic order while suffering is experienced by each individual. Just because the universe has more good than evil does not automatically provide an adequate explanation for why an individual must suffer.

An Avicennian response may state that we are unable to determine whether the suffering experienced by an individual is really necessary based solely on our limited perspective. Our knowledge of the full causal chain is incomplete, and what appears gratuitous from an individual perspective may have additional consequences we are unaware of.

Moreover, Avicenna's theory does not demand that each type of suffering produces an identifiable advantage. Instead, his theory holds that some evils are caused by natural processes whose presence contributes to a greater order of goodness.

Although this response establishes that suffering may be necessary for preserving some greater goods, it does not prove that each instance of suffering is actually necessary. Thus, despite this attempt to address the objection raised against Avicenna's theory regarding gratuitous suffering, it remains a strong challenge to his position.

Conclusion

Avicenna's response to the problem of evil relies upon two core concepts: evil in itself is merely the deprivation of good; and some evils occur incidentally within a universal order whose goodness exceeds its imperfections.

He clarifies how something can be good in itself while creating harm through distinctions between essential and accidental evil. Further, Avicenna develops an understanding of divine providence that gives reason for why God might tolerate certain evils instead of removing the natural factors associated with them.

I believe Avicenna presents an effective explanation for why divine goodness does not preclude evil. That being said, I believe the question surrounding gratuitous suffering raises difficulties and challenges, especially when no greater good is apparent.

References

Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā). The Metaphysics of the Healing. Translated by Michael E. Marmura, Brigham Young University Press, 2005. Book IX, Chapter 6, pp. 339–347.