Avicenna's Argument for the Immateriality of the Intellect

By Mohamad Farhat

An examination of Avicenna's argument for the immateriality of the intellect.

Introduction

Can all intellectual comprehension occur based on physical processes? According to Avicenna, this is impossible. As our senses rely on physical organs, the mind (intellect) has the ability to comprehend universal ideas which are not limited to specific physical objects. This is not just a different level of thinking; it is evidence that comprehending universal ideas requires a non-physical faculty of the mind.

In this paper I will explain how Avicenna explains the physical process of sense experience and how it differs from intellectual abstraction. In addition to explaining how Avicenna argues that the universal concepts that the intellect understands are indivisible, I will also evaluate a potential critique regarding the connection between the intellect's function and the brain.

Sense Experience vs. Intellectual Comprehension

In The Book of the Soul of The Healing, Avicenna identifies three main types of mental faculties: external senses, internal senses, and intellect. Since each type of mental faculty apprehends its objects differently, this is central to Avicenna's explanation of how we understand things.

The external senses apprehend physical objects as separate entities using various parts of our body. When you see a tree for example, your eyes use visual data to identify the tree's color, shape, etc. The imagination retains images after the objects themselves are gone.

Yet, since these representations are still individualized images of a tree, they continue to contain attributes inherent to material objects. Unlike the individualized image of a tree, the intellect is able to recognize trees in general, without restricting the concept to any single tree.

Since universal ideas are not limited by any attribute that is related to an individualized object, Avicenna argues that understanding universal ideas through the intellect involves abstraction from the attributes that differentiate one individualized object from another. Therefore, instead of representing a particular object, the intellect represents what is common among many similar objects.

Argument for the Immateriality of the Intellect

Avicenna's argument rests on the relationship between the essence of universal intellectual forms and the faculty that recognizes them. If universal intellectual forms are derived from abstraction from matter and its particularizing conditions, then the intellect that recognizes them cannot be a material organ like the senses.

Here is one of Avicenna's arguments:

  1. The intellect recognizes universal concepts abstracted from matter and its particularizing conditions.
  2. If intellectual forms were to exist in a divisible material organ they would be divisible according to that organ.
  3. Since intellectual forms cannot be divided in this manner without compromising their very nature, the intellect cannot be a divisible material organ.

The second premise is especially important here. All extended bodies possess spatial extension and therefore can be divided. However if an intellectual form existed in a bodily organ as a material property, that organ could be divided and so too would the intellectual form existing in it.

Consider for example the universal concept of humanity. Even though its definition can be broken down into genus (animality) and differentia (rationality), humanity as a whole cannot be broken down into spatial parts in the same way that an individual can.

According to Avicenna treating intellectual forms as properties of divisible bodies means that their divisibility would depend on material extension. But the fundamental aspects of a universal concept do not relate to spatial divisions. Thus the intellect cannot receive universal forms in the way that a bodily organ receives sensible forms.

This gives Avicenna reason to distinguish the intellect from the material faculties responsible for perception and imagination.

Objection from Brain Function

There may be an objection that says that brain functions determine our intellectual activities. Damaging certain areas of the brain can result in impaired memory, impaired reasoning skills, and other cognitive deficits. If our intellectual understanding can only occur due to proper brain function, why should we think that there is anything about the intellect itself that is not purely material?

The objection can be put as follows:

  1. Our intellectual activities are dependent on brain function.
  2. Brain functions are physical.
  3. Therefore our intellectual activities are completely physical.

While this objection presents an interesting problem, its conclusion does not necessarily follow logically from its premises. The fact that our cognitive processes begin with some sort of sensory experience and ultimately rely on the imagination and senses in order to acquire knowledge does not establish that intellectual understanding itself is purely material.

Avicenna states that while human cognition usually occurs first through sensory experience and that the intellect relies on both sensory experience and imagination in achieving knowledge, he believes there is a distinction between what enables us to intellectually comprehend something and what that comprehension itself entails.

A critic may argue that establishing such distinctions does not prove immateriality. It is possible for universal concepts to be represented through complex material processes without having the spatial attributes of those structures used to represent them.

However, Avicenna could respond that the objection does not explain how a material faculty apprehends universal concepts independently of the particularizing conditions of matter. Nevertheless, this response does not conclusively rule out a material explanation.

Conclusion

Avicenna's argument for the immateriality of the intellect rests on the distinction between sense experience and intellectual comprehension. While the senses apprehend particular objects, the intellect apprehends universal concepts abstracted from matter. Since these concepts cannot be divided spatially like material objects, Avicenna concludes that the intellect must be immaterial.

I find his distinction between sensory experience and intellectual understanding persuasive. However, whether this distinction necessarily proves the immateriality of the intellect remains open to debate.

References

Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā). Avicenna's De Anima (Arabic Text): Being the Psychological Part of Kitāb al-Shifāʾ. Edited by Fazlur Rahman, Oxford University Press, 1959.

McGinnis, Jon. Avicenna. Oxford University Press, 2010.