Avicennian Necessitarianism: Does God Create Necessarily?
An examination of whether God's nature necessitates creation in Avicenna's metaphysics.
Introduction
If God's existence is necessary, does it follow that He will necessarily create? The necessary existence of God does not in itself indicate that creation is necessary. Avicenna's metaphysical framework shows that both are necessary. For example, if God is unchangeable and has always had the nature by virtue of which He causes existence, it would seem to follow that His effects occur necessarily. Thus there is a major issue surrounding divine freedom: if God is unable to avoid creating, in what way can He be said to have created voluntarily?
I will present an argument showing that Avicenna's necessitarianism is consistent with the idea of divine freedom provided that freedom does not require an individual to be able to choose otherwise. The distinction between necessity and compulsion is very important in this regard; so too is Avicenna's distinction between what is necessary through itself and what is necessary through another.
The Necessity of Divine Creation
Avicenna uses the terms "the Necessary Existent through itself" and "existent that is possible through itself" in The Metaphysics of the Healing, Book I, Chapter 6. A Necessary Existent through itself exists independently of any cause. All other existent things are contingent and their existence depends on some cause or causes. Moreover, when the complete cause of a contingent being obtains, that being's existence becomes necessary through another, though its essence remains contingent.
This distinction is critical to Avicenna's account of creation. God alone is necessary through Himself, while all others depend on God either directly or indirectly through intermediary causes. If God's nature is immutable and He is the complete cause of His first effect, then that effect must follow necessarily from God.
The argument can be represented as follows:
- God exists necessarily and possesses an immutable nature.
- Any complete cause generates its effect necessarily.
- God is the complete cause of His first effect.
- Therefore, God's first effect follows necessarily from His nature.
If the premises are accepted, the conclusion follows. In particular, premise 2 is critical. If a complete cause were to obtain without generating its effect, then we would need to account for why the effect occurs in one case and not in another, given that the cause was complete in each case. Avicenna's principle of causal necessitation precludes such a scenario.
Hence, God's first effect follows necessarily from His nature; likewise, the rest of the order of creation follows through a hierarchical structure of causes. Nonetheless, these effects remain contingent through themselves, since their essences provide no explanation for their existence.
Objections to Avicennian Necessitarianism
One prominent criticism of Avicennian necessitarianism is that it seems to deny God freedom. If God necessarily creates, then He cannot refrain from creating. If He cannot refrain from creating, how can He be said to create voluntarily?
The criticism can be stated formally as follows:
- An agent exercises freedom only if they could have acted differently.
- God necessarily creates; hence He could not have refrained from creating.
- Hence God did not create freely.
This criticism is formally valid; however, the first premise can be disputed. The premise implies a libertarian view of freedom which suggests that true freedom requires alternative possibilities. Why should the lack of alternatives constitute an inability to act freely?
Avicenna's Account of Divine Will Provides an Alternative
Book VIII of The Metaphysics of the Healing addresses the relationship between divine causation and God's knowledge of Himself and the order of goodness emanating from Him. According to Avicenna, God does not create through external coercion; neither does He create without knowledge. Rather, creation arises eternally from God's intellect and will.
Here we see an important distinction between necessity and compulsion. An action may arise necessarily from an agent's nature without being forced upon that agent by something external. As long as there is nothing external determining God's nature or forcing Him to act, divine necessity does not amount to divine compulsion.
An objector may reply that simply lacking external compulsion is not enough for genuine freedom. While this response is understandable, it does not reveal a contradiction in Avicenna's position but rather reflects a disagreement about the requirements for free agency. Unless freedom entails choice among different options, the above objection does not conclusively prove that Avicenna's views are inconsistent.
Can Necessitarianism Undermine Contingency?
Another objection is whether Avicenna's necessitarianism contradicts the distinction between necessary and contingent existence. If God exists necessarily and produces His effects necessarily, and those effects necessarily produce further effects, then it would appear that the whole order of existence is necessary.
Criticisms based on this objection ignore Avicenna's distinction between necessity through oneself and necessity through another. That a contingent being's existence is necessary through another does not make it a necessary being through itself; thus its essence remains insufficient to justify its actuality, and it remains dependent on something external. Thus, even if every member of the chain of causality exists necessarily through its cause, the members are contingent through themselves.
Kit Fine emphasizes a similar distinction in Essence and Modality (1994), between essence and modal necessity. Simply because a property pertains to something necessarily does not entitle us to say that it pertains to its essence. Likewise, just because a contingent being's existence is made necessary through its cause does not entitle us to say that its essence necessitates existence.
Thus, Avicenna's necessitarianism does not reduce all entities to one single Necessary Existent. Only God exists through Himself; all others depend upon Him.
Conclusion
It appears that Avicenna's necessitarianism implies that God must create necessarily because of His immutable nature and complete causal activity. However, this does not mean that creation is involuntary.
There is a main controversy regarding whether liberty requires choice between alternatives. If so, then Avicenna's account may face a serious objection. On the other hand, if liberty means doing something through your own knowledge and will without external compulsion, then necessary creation may coexist with divine liberty.
I am persuaded by the second interpretation. Lack of alternatives does not show per se that an action is involuntary. Additionally, Avicenna's distinction between necessity through self and necessity through another maintains contingency among created beings without eliminating their causal necessity.
Finally, the strength of Avicennian necessitarianism lies in its capacity to separate two ideas frequently confused: necessity vs. compulsion and causal necessity vs. essential necessity. Ultimately whether or not you accept Avicenna's conclusions depends heavily on whether or not you believe these distinctions enable a viable notion of divine liberty.
References
Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā). The Metaphysics of the Healing. Translated by Michael E. Marmura, Brigham Young University Press, 2005. Books I, VIII–IX.
Fine, Kit. "Essence and Modality." Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 8, 1994, pp. 1–16.