Does Avicenna Draw Incorrect Conclusions from Necessary Existence?
An examination of Avicenna's arguments for the divine attributes of the Necessary Existent.
I recently came across many people arguing that while Avicenna may have been able to demonstrate that there has to be a Necessary Existent, he drew incorrect conclusions as to what characteristics that Necessary Existent possesses. Most criticisms regarding this issue involve divine oneness (unity), complete simplicity, and knowledge. Critics argue that, regardless of accepting that there must exist a Necessary Existent, we do not have sufficient grounds to conclude that the Necessary Existent has the specific attributes (e.g., unity, simplicity, knowledge) which have traditionally been attributed to God in classical monotheistic thought. Consequently, we would still need to show that the Necessary Existent has the properties associated with God.
In my previous essay, I defended Avicenna's argument from contingency and concluded that at least one Necessary Existent must exist. However, establishing that something exists necessarily is not the same as establishing what that existent must be like. This is precisely the question I want to examine here.
In The Metaphysics of the Healing, particularly Book I, Chapter 7 and Book VIII, Chapters 4–7, Avicenna presents various metaphysical proofs to support his claims regarding the attributes of the Necessary Existent. Three of these proofs concern oneness, total simplicity, and intellect/knowledge. After examining each proof, I will assess whether Avicenna demonstrates these attributes using the reasoning he presents in The Metaphysics of the Healing.
Do Essential Necessity and Unity Go Together?
Firstly, I am going to explore the connection between essential necessity and divine oneness. In Book I, Chapter 7 of The Metaphysics of the Healing, Avicenna argues that there can be no two Necessary Existents. Why is this true? Could there simply be two completely independent entities that exist necessarily through themselves?
In order to see how Avicenna arrives at his conclusion, let us consider two possible Necessary Existents, A and B. Since A and B are two distinct existents, there must be something that distinguishes A from B. Otherwise, we would lack grounds for claiming that A and B are distinct in the first place.
How is the distinction between A and B established? Is it due to a characteristic of each existent considered in itself, or is it due to something outside of each existent?
If the distinction between A and B is established by a factor outside of each existent, then at least one of the proposed Necessary Existents is dependent upon something outside itself to determine its identity. As discussed earlier, however, a Necessary Existent cannot be dependent upon an external factor for determining what it is.
Alternatively, if the distinction between A and B is determined by their respective essences, then A and B would have to have different essences. However, Avicenna states that necessary existence through itself cannot be a universal nature that can be shared by more than one individual, differentiated by secondary characteristics. Any additional characteristic that distinguishes between the two would introduce composition into what was supposed to be a single entity existing necessarily through itself.
This is closely related to the principle of individuation. If two existents share the same nature, we must ask what makes each one a distinct individual. For Avicenna, necessary existence cannot function like a common species whose individual members are distinguished by additional properties.
At this point, the argument becomes particularly intriguing. If two supposed Necessary Existents share necessary existence but are differentiated by some aspect in addition to their shared existence, then their individuality would depend on that additional aspect. Thus, since something whose existence or individuation is dependent upon constituent elements cannot exist in an absolutely independent manner, the concept of two entities having existence through themselves in an absolute sense appears impossible.
Some critics raise an important objection when they argue that A and B can simply be distinct without requiring some additional factor to justify their distinction. They ask: Why can't we have two fundamentally distinct necessary beings?
Although I think this objection is a serious challenge to Avicenna's reasoning because it questions the idea that every distinction necessitates a justification, I remain convinced that Avicenna has provided a reasonable demonstration based on his account of necessary existence. If the Necessary Existent is purely independent and does not have a nature which allows for multiplication through additional aspects, then I do not see why Avicenna cannot demonstrate that a plurality of such independent existents is impossible.
Of course, this reasoning depends on accepting that numerical distinction requires some basis in the nature or individuation of the existents. Someone who rejects that principle could still maintain that two necessary beings are primitively distinct. The disagreement therefore concerns more than the definition of necessity itself.
Consequently, I conclude that the concept of necessary existence, as described by Avicenna, implies oneness. There cannot be two completely independent Necessary Existents.
Is Total Simplicity Entailed by Necessary Existence?
We now move to the second attribute: divine simplicity. It is probably one of the most contentious conclusions Avicenna derives from the existence of the Necessary Existent. Avicenna argues that the Necessary Existent cannot consist of parts and that its essence cannot be distinct from its existence.
Book VIII, Chapters 4 and 5 of The Metaphysics of the Healing contain Avicenna's arguments for establishing both points. His overall strategy is to demonstrate the relationship between composition and dependency.
Let us begin by considering something composed of multiple parts. Consider a house as an example. A house is obviously dependent upon the materials and structure comprising it. Without these materials or this structure, the house would not exist as it presently does. The same applies to any composite thing, whether material or nonmaterial, whose existence depends upon its constituent parts.
However, can the Necessary Existent be composite? No, according to Avicenna. If the Necessary Existent consisted of parts, then it would depend on those parts for its existence. And if it depends on something else, then it does not truly exist necessarily through itself.
The issue here is not whether the parts existed before the whole in time. Even if a composite being had existed eternally, it would still depend on its constituents to be what it is. Thus, the dependence Avicenna is concerned with is ontological rather than temporal.
This line of reasoning appears clear enough. However, Avicenna takes this argument one step further than simply rejecting physical composition.
He argues that the Necessary Existent cannot have a quiddity distinct from its existence. Quiddity refers here to what something is, considered apart from the fact that it actually exists. Wherever we encounter contingency (as opposed to necessary existence), we can distinguish between what something is and whether that thing exists. For example, we can comprehend what constitutes a tree without thereby establishing that any particular tree exists.
As mentioned before, the situation with the Necessary Existent is very different. If it had a quiddity distinct from its existence, then we would need to provide some explanation for why that quiddity actually existed. Either its existence would arise from its quiddity or from something beyond it. However, if its existence required something beyond its quiddity, then the supposed Necessary Existent would not exist necessarily through itself. And if its existence arose from its own quiddity, Avicenna would still need to explain how that quiddity could account for its existence without presupposing it.
This is particularly significant because Avicenna is not merely denying that the Necessary Existent has physical parts. He is also rejecting a more fundamental kind of metaphysical composition, namely the distinction between an essence that receives existence and the existence it receives.
There are objections raised against Avicenna's conclusion. Someone might argue that a necessary being can possess multiple attributes without relying on anything external for those attributes. What is wrong with attributing different properties to a necessary being? Why should possessing distinct attributes necessarily imply contingency?
I believe this objection raises a serious challenge because possessing multiple attributes does not necessarily establish dependence upon constituent parts. To defend Avicenna's conclusion, we must also accept his understanding of composition and why genuine distinctions within an existent would imply dependence.
An important distinction must therefore be made between conceptual and real distinctions. We might describe the same existent through several concepts without implying that these concepts correspond to separate constituents within the existent itself. The difficulty arises when those attributes are taken to be really distinct features of its essence.
Nevertheless, I remain convinced that Avicenna provides a compelling argument against composition in the Necessary Existent, particularly insofar as composition entails dependence upon constituent parts. What remains open to criticism is whether every real distinction between attributes necessarily introduces such dependence.
Can a Necessary Being Possess Intellect and Knowledge?
Finally, I wish to address the third property attributed to God in classical monotheistic theology, namely intellect and knowledge. Even though we accept that there is only one Necessary Existent and that it is totally simple, why should we believe that it possesses intellect? Might the Necessary Existent simply be an unintelligent metaphysical principle?
Book VIII, Chapter 6 of The Metaphysics of the Healing provides Avicenna's reasons for arguing that the Necessary Existent is intellect, intellecting, and intelligible. While part of his argument concerns the immateriality of the Necessary Existent and how immateriality relates to intellectual apprehension, he also provides reasoning based on his theory of causality.
Matter is related to potentiality and to obstacles preventing a form from being intelligible in actuality. Any existent which is completely free from matter has none of these impediments. As previously stated, since the Necessary Existent is immaterial and lacks potentiality which requires actualization, Avicenna concludes that it is intelligible in itself.
However, does being intelligible automatically imply possessing intellect? This is an area where careful scrutiny is required in assessing Avicenna's argument. Something could be intelligible to another without itself possessing knowledge. Mathematical truths provide examples of this type of intelligibility.
Avicenna's view, however, extends beyond simply claiming that the Necessary Existent can be understood. He argues that an immaterial existent whose essence is immediately present to itself is both intellecting and intelligible. Since the Necessary Existent is immaterial, it has nothing preventing its essence from being directly intelligible to itself.
This is where the distinction between potential and actual intellect becomes relevant. Avicenna does not understand divine knowledge as something acquired through a process of learning. Rather, the Necessary Existent possesses intellectual actuality without requiring any transition from ignorance to knowledge.
This provides a basis for asserting that the Necessary Existent knows itself.
Regarding knowledge of other existents, Avicenna also asserts that the Necessary Existent knows all other things through its knowledge of itself as their ultimate cause or origin. Since the Necessary Existent is ultimately responsible for everything in terms of causation, its knowledge of itself encompasses knowledge of what proceeds from it.
This also raises the question of how divine knowledge relates to immutability. If the Necessary Existent acquired new knowledge whenever something changed, then its intellectual state would undergo change as well. Avicenna therefore understands divine knowledge through an eternal apprehension of the causal order rather than successive acts of learning.
Critics can raise an objection to Avicenna's assertion by arguing that causal priority does not necessarily imply intellect or knowledge. Natural causes produce their effects without intellect or knowledge. Why should this be different for the Necessary Existent?
I think this criticism is more difficult than those dealing with oneness and simplicity. Causal priority alone does not prove intellect or knowledge. To support Avicenna's conclusion, we must also accept his conception of immaterial intellect and the relationship between self-knowledge and knowledge of effects.
Although the argument for divine knowledge may be less obvious or persuasive than either the argument for unity or the argument for simplicity, I do not believe the conclusion is arbitrary. It seems to me that the conclusion follows from Avicenna's attempt to establish additional metaphysical principles that he uses to argue for divine knowledge.
Since I have now discussed each of the three attributes, it should be evident that Avicenna does not derive these properties solely from the fact that the Necessary Existent exists of necessity. Rather, he develops additional arguments to establish that the Necessary Existent is One, Absolutely Simple, and intellectually apprehending.
While I do believe that Avicenna's arguments regarding these three attributes can be criticized, for example, someone might reject the premises used to derive uniqueness, deny that all composition involves dependence upon something else, or challenge his views on immaterial intellect, these would represent genuine philosophical disagreements. Nevertheless, I remain convinced that his conclusions regarding oneness and simplicity follow logically from his broader account of necessary existence. His conclusion regarding divine knowledge requires further metaphysical commitments, which provide a basis for his argument.
Thus, I conclude that Avicenna presents a compelling case for identifying the Necessary Existent with God. Since the Necessary Existent is a single entity which exists necessarily through itself, is absolutely one, contains no composition whatsoever, and possesses intellect and knowledge, I believe Avicenna presents a compelling case for identifying the Necessary Existent as the One, Simple, and Knowing God described in classical monotheistic theology.
Although Avicenna's arguments do not provide an exhaustive account of all divine attributes, nor do they resolve all questions about what God is like, I still believe that they present a reasonable basis for rejecting the view that the Necessary Existent is simply an abstract explanation for contingent reality.
For these reasons, I do not believe Avicenna derives the wrong conclusions. Rather, I believe that his metaphysical arguments present a compelling framework for understanding the Necessary Existent as our One, Simple, and Knowing God.
References
Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā). The Metaphysics of the Healing. Translated by Michael E. Marmura, Brigham Young University Press, 2005. Book I, Chapters 6–7; Book VIII, Chapters 3–7.