The Contingency Argument: Avicenna vs. Leibniz

By Mohamad Farhat

A comparison of Avicenna's and Leibniz's contingency arguments.

The key differences between Avicenna's argument from contingency and Leibniz's argument from the Principle of Sufficient Reason concern how they address the question of why contingent reality exists. They use similar concepts, such as necessity, contingency, and dependency, but they use them differently.

Avicenna examines this question by distinguishing between an existent that exists necessarily through itself (the Necessary Existent) and one whose existence depends upon something else (a contingent existent). As long as a contingent existent exists through another, it will always require an explanation for its existence. Avicenna rejects the idea that an infinite regress of dependent causes can provide an ultimate explanation. The reason is not merely because of the finite limits of our ability to explain; it is because explaining each member of a chain of contingent existents is not necessarily equivalent to explaining why the entire chain of contingent existents exists.

Leibniz uses a different approach to reach a very similar result. Instead of examining the issue of contingency through distinctions between types of existence (necessary vs. contingent), Leibniz addresses it using the concept of sufficient reason. According to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, no fact can exist or be true unless there is a sufficient reason why it is so rather than otherwise (The Monadology, §32). This principle allows Leibniz to analyze the question of why contingent reality exists. By applying it to the contingent existence of the world, Leibniz reaches the conclusion that the sufficient reason for the world's existence must be provided by something whose existence is necessary and not contingent.

While both philosophers arrive at the same conclusion, that contingent reality ultimately depends upon a necessary being, they employ different methods to get to that conclusion. Therefore, both philosophers seek to show that contingent reality requires an explanation that comes from something that exists through itself. However, they follow different paths to achieve this goal.

The Philosophical Foundations of Each Argument

One difference between the two philosophers is the way in which they frame their respective arguments. Avicenna frames his argument in terms of the relationship between essence, existence, and causality. Since a contingent existent has an essence that does not necessitate its existence, it must have a cause. Leibniz frames his argument in terms of the requirements for a complete explanation. According to him, every contingent fact requires a sufficient reason. Therefore, since the existence of the world is a contingent fact, it too must require a sufficient reason.

Although their ways of framing their arguments differ, both philosophers are attempting to arrive at the same conclusion regarding the nature of contingency. Thus, they share a common purpose. They both attempt to demonstrate that contingent reality ultimately depends upon a necessary being.

A second difference between Avicenna and Leibniz arises from the fact that Leibniz employs the Principle of Sufficient Reason more broadly than Avicenna applies his distinction between necessary and contingent beings. While Avicenna emphasizes the metaphysical dependence of contingent existents, Leibniz attempts to determine why contingent facts obtain at all.

Therefore, while both philosophers may agree on the ultimate explanatory ambition, i.e., that contingent reality must be explained, it appears that they differ in how they pursue that ambition.

The Problem of Explaining the Whole

An additional concern with regard to both arguments is whether contingent reality collectively requires an explanation over and above the individual explanations of its constituent parts. Suppose every individual part of the world is contingent. Should we suppose that there must be an additional explanation for the collective set of contingent parts?

Some people object to both philosophers' conclusions based upon this issue. Someone may say that since every member is contingent, it would risk committing the fallacy of composition to conclude that the whole must be contingent as well. Therefore, we must explain why individual members alone fail to provide an adequate explanation for the entire series.

Leibniz addresses this problem in two works. First, in The Monadology, Sections 36–38, he presents an argument concerning an infinite succession of contingent explanations. Second, in On the Ultimate Origination of Things, he includes an example of an infinitely copied book that illustrates the problem he believes occurs in such cases.

Leibniz argues that an infinite succession of contingent explanations does not constitute a sufficient reason for why such a succession exists.

Avicenna approaches this challenge in much the same manner. Avicenna suggests that an order composed entirely of existents that depend upon others cannot possess ultimate explanatory independence.

On balance, I tend to side with both philosophers on this matter. There is a meaningful distinction between explaining each member of a series and explaining why that series exists.

However, it is easy to imagine someone who will dispute the need for an ultimate explanation of contingency. That person would likely argue that contingent reality simply exists as a brute fact and has no need for any further explanation.

Such a rejection of the need for an ultimate explanation would not deny that there are causes for various individual contingent things. Rather, it would assert that contingent reality collectively need not have any further explanation.

Therefore, I believe that the primary area of contention lies in whether contingent reality collectively requires an ultimate explanation. If someone accepts that contingent reality collectively requires an ultimate explanation, then both Avicenna and Leibniz present plausible rationales for locating that explanation in something necessary through itself. However, if someone rejects the notion that contingent reality collectively requires an ultimate explanation, then neither philosopher can proceed without providing a rationale for its explanatory foundation.

Necessary Existence in Avicenna and Leibniz

A third area of agreement between Avicenna and Leibniz concerns what they view as necessary in order to ground contingency. For both thinkers, contingency requires grounding in something whose existence is necessary rather than contingent. However, their approaches to explaining necessary existence differ.

According to Avicenna, something exists necessarily through itself if its nonexistence is impossible when considered in itself. Therefore, the Necessary Existent is something whose existence does not depend upon anything external, and Avicenna further argues that it possesses no quiddity distinct from its existence.

By contrast, Leibniz establishes the need for a necessary being through the Principle of Sufficient Reason. For Leibniz, a necessary being has the sufficient reason for its existence in its own nature. Therefore, the Necessary Being is something whose existence does not depend upon an external cause.

Because they approach necessary existence in different manners, Avicenna and Leibniz differ regarding how they establish an entity that grounds contingency. Nonetheless, despite their differences on this matter, both philosophers are in substantial accord regarding what they see as necessary in order to ground contingency, i.e., something whose existence is not dependent upon anything external.

As previously noted, Leibniz asserts that an ultimate reason for why contingent reality exists must lie outside of an infinite series of contingent existents. Similarly, Avicenna holds that there must be an existent whose existence is not grounded in something else (an existent whose existence is necessary).

Although Avicenna and Leibniz approach the explanation of necessary existence differently, they concur on what is essential in constituting such an entity: namely, that it must be self-existent and not dependent upon something else.

Therefore, while Avicenna and Leibniz approach necessary existence differently, they agree on what they perceive as essential characteristics of entities whose existence is necessary: i.e., self-existence and independence from external dependencies.

The similarity in what Avicenna and Leibniz agree upon, i.e., self-existence and independence from external dependencies, serves to illustrate just how much they share in common with respect to their arguments regarding contingency.

Which Argument Is Stronger?

The difference between the two arguments is meaningful; however, I prefer Avicenna's formulation.

I do not think Leibniz's Principle of Sufficient Reason is an unreasonable idea. In fact, I believe it embodies an essential notion of how to understand an explanation. It seems quite natural to inquire into why something exists when there are many alternatives (i.e., why something exists as opposed to not).

Leibniz articulates the explanatory demand clearly. However, since the explanatory demand is articulated as a universal principle, an opponent could reject the Principle of Sufficient Reason in general or challenge whether the principle applies to contingent reality as a whole.

As opposed to a broad formulation where the general Principle of Sufficient Reason is applied universally, Avicenna takes a narrower path. He does not assert that every fact is based upon some reason. Instead, he asks what it means for something to be contingent through itself. If the nature of the existent does not include a reason for its existence, then the question of what gives rise to its actuality follows naturally from its contingency.

Of course, this does not mean Avicenna has escaped all objections raised toward Leibniz. Both authors must contend with the objection that they have failed to demonstrate that an entirely contingent realm cannot simply exist without an ultimate explanation. The metaphysical basis for rejecting this type of contingent realm is provided by Avicenna's theory of causality. But the extent to which that basis is philosophically justifiable is subject to philosophical debate.

Therefore, I would not argue that Avicenna's argument is obviously better. I do feel that Avicenna's formulation presents a clearer picture of why contingent existents depend upon other entities, while Leibniz provides a more lucid account of why an endless series of contingent reasons does not necessarily provide an adequate explanation for everything.

Thus, I see the two theories as complementary. Avicenna explains why contingent existence implies dependence, whereas Leibniz argues that simply providing causal explanations for each dependent element does not necessarily provide an explanation for the entirety.

Conclusion

Most importantly, I am fascinated that two thinkers in completely different cultural and intellectual environments were able to identify the same central issue. Both argue that despite the provision of an infinite number of contingent explanations, there can still remain something unexplained.

While they differ over the manner through which the dependency of contingent beings should be explained philosophically, neither philosopher disputes whether contingent beings can exist.

Because Avicenna bases his need for explanation in the distinction between necessary and contingent being, I tend to be more convinced of his formulation.

Despite that, I also believe Leibniz's Principle of Sufficient Reason represents a good way to understand why an unlimited multitude of contingent explanations will probably not yield an ultimate reason for reality.

There is no doubt that both arguments face criticism. Both authors must face the possibility that contingent reality has no ultimate cause or explanation.

However, I consider the view that contingent reality ultimately requires a necessary foundation much preferable to the claim that it simply exists as a brute fact. Therefore, if contingent existents cannot account for their own existence, I believe that we have strong evidence for believing that ultimately reality depends upon something whose existence is necessary through itself.

References

Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā). The Metaphysics of the Healing. Translated by Michael E. Marmura, Brigham Young University Press, 2005. Book I, Chapter 6; Book VIII, Chapters 1–4.

Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. The Monadology. 1714. Sections 31–38.

Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. On the Ultimate Origination of Things. 1697.