The Takfīr of Avicenna (Part 1)

By Mohamad Farhat

A Defense of Ibn Sīnā (My Favorite Essay)

Introduction

Throughout Islam’s philosophical history, many thinkers have condemned Ibn Sina (Avicenna) for his philosophies. Many have even considered certain aspects of his philosophy to be an act of disbelief (kufr). The two most well-known of these critics were al-Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyyah; both critics have objected to Avicenna’s views such as whether the universe is eternal, Allah’s knowledge of particulars, and if the body will be resurrected after death.

What I find especially fascinating about these claims is that a number of them leveled at Avicenna were not as simple as they may seem. Avicenna's view of the eternality of the universe does not mean that the universe exists independently of Allah. Rather, his entire metaphysics depends upon the relationship of necessary existence to contingent existence. As such, his view of the world was often seen as being inconsistent with mainstream Muslim theology.

Moreover, I find it interesting that these critiques did not remain unanswered.

Ibn Rushd wrote "Tahafut al-Tahafut" (The Incoherence of the Incoherence); however, unlike others who responded to Al-Ghazali ("Tahafut al-Falasifah," The Incoherence of the Philosophers) Ibn Rushd was not merely a defender of Avicenna. Rather, while there were certainly differences between Avicenna and Ibn Rushd on key issues, Ibn Rushd provided detailed refutations of many of the arguments which had been raised against philosophers.

It is my intention within this essay to examine each of the primary criticisms raised against Avicenna, specifically those made by al-Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyya, and provide a response to each criticism separately. I shall rely on Avicenna's writings, responses by other philosophers, and my own reasoning to show how many of these criticisms are either incorrect, unjustified, or unsuccessful in proving what their authors intended.

Outline of the Essay

Throughout this essay, I intend to examine the major criticisms directed against Avicenna, the philosophical reasoning behind them, and whether they justify the accusations of disbelief made against him. I will organize my examination into the following eight sections:

  1. The Eternity of the Universe: Al-Ghazali's and Ibn Taymiyyah's objections to Avicenna's understanding of eternal creation, alongside Ibn Rushd's responses.
  2. Allah's Knowledge of Particulars: Whether Avicenna denies Allah's knowledge of individual events or instead explains divine knowledge in a different manner.
  3. Bodily Resurrection and the Afterlife: Avicenna's position on bodily resurrection and al-Ghazālī's accusation that the philosophers' denial of it constitutes disbelief.
  4. Divine Necessity and Freedom: Whether Avicenna's account of necessary causation deprives Allah of freedom and the ability to act otherwise.
  5. Divine Attributes and Simplicity: Criticisms of Avicenna's understanding of Allah's knowledge, power, will, and essence.
  6. Emanation and the Intellects: Objections to Avicenna's theory of emanation and whether it is compatible with Islamic monotheism.
  7. Scholars Who Defended and Praised Ibn Sina: An examination of Muslim scholars and philosophers who defended Avicenna, praised his intellectual achievements, or developed his philosophical positions.

In examining the first six subjects, I will follow four steps:

  1. The Accusation: Present the criticism made against Avicenna and identify its source.
  2. Avicenna's Position: Examine what Avicenna actually argued, primarily through his own writings.
  3. Historical Responses: Consider how other philosophers, particularly Ibn Rushd and al-Tusi where relevant, responded to these criticisms.
  4. My Response: Provide my own reasoning for why I consider the criticism convincing or unconvincing, and whether it provides sufficient grounds for takfir.

I. The Eternity of the Universe

Al-Ghazali's Criticism of Avicenna

Al-Ghazali criticized Avicenna for his view of the eternity of the universe. In The Incoherence of the Philosophers, especially the first discussion of that work, al-Ghazali attacked the philosophers' view that the universe had no temporal origin. Al-Ghazali believed that this doctrine was not just a philosophical mistake; he thought it was a denial (kufr) of Islam.

Al-Ghazali argues that Allah created the universe by His will, and not that the universe has been in existence forever as a result of His nature. Al-Ghazali says that Allah could eternally will the universe to come into existence and yet Allah would not undergo any change.

Moreover, al-Ghazali states that Avicenna's theory of necessary causation eliminates God's freedom by rendering the coming into existence of the universe as a necessary outcome of God's nature. Because of those reasons, al-Ghazali believes that the doctrine of the eternity of the universe is incompatible with Islamic revelation and thus provides grounds for declaring its proponents disbelievers.

What Avicenna Actually Believes

Avicenna's views derive from his distinctions between necessity and contingency. In The Metaphysics of the Healing, specifically Books VIII and IX, he asserts that only Allah is the Necessary Existent whose existence is independent of anything else. All beings other than Allah are contingent in themselves and therefore need a cause.

Avicenna argues that a contingent being continues to require a cause because of its contingent nature, regardless of whether it has existed since all eternity. Moreover, Avicenna says that because Allah exists eternally and is unchangeable, His causal activities cannot consist of a transition from being inactive to active. Therefore, if Allah is eternally a full cause, then His effect must exist eternally. Nonetheless, that effect continues to depend on Him.

Similarly, in Al-Isharat wa al-Tanbihat (Remarks and Admonitions), Avicenna makes the distinction between creation and origination in time. Avicenna holds that something can receive its existence from another without being preceded by nonexistence in time.

Therefore, according to Avicenna, creation is an eternal relation of dependency. Although the universe may have no temporal beginning, it still receives its entire existence from Allah.

Historical Responses

Ibn Rushd reacts to al-Ghazali's criticisms in The Incoherence of the Incoherence. Ibn Rushd rejects the philosophers' condemnation regarding the eternity of the universe and contests al-Ghazali's assumption that divine creation necessitates a temporal beginning.

Also in The Decisive Treatise, Ibn Rushd examines the Quranic descriptions of creation. Ibn Rushd cites Quran 11:7, where Allah creates the heavens and earth while His Throne is upon water. Also, Quran 41:11 describes heaven as smoke prior to its development. Ibn Rushd takes these verses as indicating that the Quran does not establish an absolute beginning to all existence other than Allah.

However, Ibn Rushd does not take these verses as definitive evidence for an eternal universe. Instead, Ibn Rushd holds that the scriptural accounts allow for varying interpretations and that a supposed agreement among Muslims concerning the meaning of these verses cannot be taken as self-evident. Thus, Ibn Rushd contests al-Ghazali's justification for declaring philosophers disbelievers based on their disagreement over this issue.

Nasir al-Din al-Tusi too wrote on the question of the eternity of the universe. In his earlier writing Tasawwurat, Nasir al-Din al-Tusi held that the world could be eternal through Allah's power while being created and contingent in itself. Similarly to Avicenna, al-Tusi differentiated the world's dependence on Allah from its duration. Nevertheless, Nasir al-Din al-Tusi changed his treatment of creation throughout his works and defended creation ex nihilo in his later Fusul.

My Response

1. Why I Find Avicenna's Explanation of Eternal Creation More Reasonable

I think Avicenna's explanation of eternal creation is more philosophically plausible than al-Ghazali's account of temporal origination.

To start with, I am convinced that creation does not necessarily imply a temporal beginning. A thing can rely on a cause without beginning to exist after that cause. This is where distinguishing dependence from temporal sequence comes into play.

Further to that, Avicenna's argument regarding divine immutability poses an important problem for al-Ghazali. If Allah is eternally a full cause, why should Allah's effect begin to exist at some point in time when it could have existed eternally?

Al-Ghazali answers that Allah has eternally willed the universe to originate. However, I find this response less persuasive because it leaves unanswered why an eternal and unchanging cause produces an effect with a temporal beginning.

Avicenna's position avoids this problem by asserting that Allah has eternally caused the universe to exist. Therefore, although the universe may have no temporal beginning, it is completely dependent on Allah for its existence.

I therefore consider Avicenna's position more rational because it allows us to maintain both Allah's eternality and immutability and the complete dependence of the universe upon Allah.

2. Even If Avicenna Is Wrong About Eternity, Does His Belief Constitute Kufr?

Even if I granted that al-Ghazali was correct and Avicenna was incorrect about eternity, that would not prove that Avicenna's belief constituted kufr.

It is critical to distinguish between holding an erroneous philosophical position and rejecting a basic tenet of Islam. To justify calling Avicenna a disbeliever (kafir), al-Ghazali needs to show that Avicenna's position goes beyond deviating from his own understanding of creation.

Notably, al-Ghazali himself writes about what constitutes kufr in Faysal al-Tafriqa bayn al-Islam wa al-Zandaqa (The Decisive Criterion for Distinguishing Islam from Unbelief).

While al-Ghazali does not provide them in a formally numbered format as requirements for takfir accusations in his book, his discussion leads to several key criteria concerning kufr:

  • Denying prophetic truthfulness: Kufr is primarily denying the trustworthiness of Prophet Muhammad about what he communicated from Allah.
  • Denying fundamental doctrines: Denying belief in Allah, Muhammad as Prophet, or the afterlife constitutes disbelief.
  • Distinction between interpretation and disavowal: Interpretations (ta'wil) of revelation do not automatically represent disbelief, provided they do not represent disavowing the Prophet's message.
  • Justification for nonliteral interpretation: Deviation from literal meanings of revelation requires adequate justification. Not every speculative interpretation is equally valid.
  • Distinction between error and disavowal: A theological error, including a religious innovation (bid'a), does not immediately make its proponent a disbeliever.

Source: Al-Ghazali, Faysal al-Tafriqa, translated by Sherman A. Jackson in On the Boundaries of Theological Tolerance in Islam (2002).

I believe that these principles (set by al ghazali himself) create substantial obstacles for al-Ghazali's characterization of Avicenna as a disbeliever (kafir).

Avicenna does not deny Allah's existence, nor does he deny Allah as the ultimate Creator. Furthermore, Avicenna's view of eternal creation does not inherently deny Muhammad's prophethood or the reality of the afterlife.

Avicenna does not reject revelation; his understanding of creation derives from a developed metaphysical argument about necessity, contingency, causation, and divine immutability. Whether such an argument succeeds remains an open matter for debate; however, such an argument cannot fairly be dismissed as a gratuitous rejection of religious truth.

Al-Ghazali acknowledges there is a difference between theological error and disbelief (kufr); this is most relevant here because even if we granted that Avicenna was mistaken about eternity, this would still leave open whether his view actually contravenes an indispensable doctrine of Islam.

I acknowledge that al-Ghazali took eternity to constitute kufr and further contended that the philosophers' doctrine contradicted religious consensus. However, I argue this very point is exactly my counterpoint. As Ibn Rushd pointed out, the Quranic descriptions of creation allow room for interpretation; and therefore, the existence of a single authoritative consensus respecting their exact meaning cannot simply be assumed.

Thus, I dismiss the claim that Avicenna's belief in an eternal universe constitutes kufr. He accepts Allah as the Necessary Existent and ultimate source of all existence. I do not believe that al-Ghazali has adequately demonstrated either that Avicenna's position is incorrect or that Avicenna's view constitutes a rejection of prophetic truthfulness.

Ultimately, even if Avicenna were philosophically wrong regarding eternity, that alone would not constitute disbelief (kufr). Al-Ghazali must demonstrate that Avicenna's view violates an indispensable tenet of Islam; I remain unconvinced that he has done so.

II. Allah's Knowledge of Particulars

Al-Ghazali's Criticism of Avicenna

Al-Ghazali’s critique of Avicenna concerns Allah’s knowledge of particulars.

As explained earlier, in the thirteenth discussion of Tahafut al-Falasifah (The Incoherence of the Philosophers), al-Ghazali attacks the philosophers’ account of divine knowledge, arguing that it fails to accommodate Allah’s knowledge of individual, changing events. He claims that such a belief constitutes disbelief (kufr).

To make his case, al-Ghazali cites a solar eclipse as an example. Before the eclipse, it can be said that it will occur; during the eclipse, it is occurring; and after the eclipse, it has occurred.

Al-Ghazali contends that the philosophers’ definition of God’s immutable and unchanging knowledge cannot capture this distinction. Furthermore, he asserts that this concept prevents God from knowing the particular acts of people and whether each person obeyed or disobeyed God.

Finally, al-Ghazali believes that this philosophy violates Quran 34:3, where God states that nothing escapes His knowledge, not even the weight of an atom. Therefore, al-Ghazali concludes that the philosophers’ beliefs violate Islamic revelation and constitute disbelief.

What Avicenna Actually Believes

However, al-Ghazali’s criticism does not fully capture Avicenna’s explanation of divine knowledge. Avicenna’s position is far more complex than just stating that God does not know the specifics about what happened.

In Book VIII, Chapter 6 of The Metaphysics of the Healing, Avicenna explains that God knows particulars, but He knows them universally. It was Avicenna’s intent to distinguish how God knows individual events from the method of knowing employed by human beings.

Avicenna posits that since God is eternal and unchangeable, His knowledge cannot be changed by the occurrences of events. Unlike humanity, whose knowledge is acquired through sensory experiences, God knows events through their causal relationships and their order of being. Avicenna utilizes the example of an eclipse to illustrate how one may understand an event to occur without needing to witness it.

Someone who understands the movement of celestial bodies and their causal relationships will certainly know when an eclipse will occur. Likewise, God’s knowledge of events occurs via their causal relationships; thus, there is no need for His knowledge to change as events occur. Additionally, Avicenna stipulates that God is the primary cause of being. Since God knows Himself as the primary cause and knows the causal order emanating from Him, He thereby knows its effects.

Therefore, Avicenna establishes a distinction between knowing an event through its causal relationships versus learning through sensory experience. While Avicenna accepts the first method as an acceptable way for God to know an event, he rejects the second method.

Historical Responses

Ibn Rushd responds to al-Ghazali's criticisms in Tahafut al-Tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence). He challenges the assumption that divine knowledge must operate in the same manner as human knowledge.

Ibn Rushd argues that human knowledge is caused by the things we observe, whereas Allah's knowledge is fundamentally different because it is related to the existence of things as their cause.

Consequently, Ibn Rushd maintains that Allah's knowledge cannot properly be described as either universal or particular in the ordinary human sense. These distinctions characterize human knowledge and cannot simply be applied to Allah. He develops this position in Tahafut al-Tahafut and a supplementary discussion associated with Fasl al-Maqal (The Decisive Treatise).

Ibn Rushd therefore rejects the accusation that the philosophers necessarily deny divine knowledge, although his explanation differs from Avicenna's own formulation.

Nasir al-Din al-Tusi also addresses this criticism in his commentary on Avicenna's Al-Isharat wa al-Tanbihat (Remarks and Admonitions).

Al-Tusi defends the distinction between knowledge of changing particulars and change within the knower. He argues that Allah can know individual events through their complete causal relationships, including the specific circumstances and times at which they occur.

According to al-Tusi, the fact that an event changes does not require Allah's knowledge of that event to change. Divine knowledge can encompass the entire order of existence without undergoing temporal succession.

My Response

1. Why I Find Avicenna's Explanation of Divine Knowledge More Reasonable

While some scholars dispute whether Avicenna’s explanation successfully accounts for all individual events, especially changing events involving particular human beings, I consider Avicenna’s theory reasonable since it gives an explanation for God’s knowledge without suggesting that God acquires knowledge as events develop.

2. Even If Avicenna Is Wrong, Does His Doctrine Constitute Kufr?

Even if I conceded that al-Ghazali were right and Avicenna’s explanation of God’s knowledge were wrong, that would still not prove that Avicenna’s theory constitutes kufr.

Simply affirming that Allah knows everything does not establish how Allah knows what He does.

Avicenna is not claiming that Allah does not know specific events. Instead, Avicenna affirms that Allah knows particulars in a universal manner based upon their causes.

This distinction is critical because the dispute centers on whether Avicenna's explanation accurately reflects God's omniscience and not whether God's omniscience is a Muslim doctrine.

As mentioned in the last section, al-Ghazali himself makes a similar distinction between theological error and disbelief in Faysal al-Tafriqa (The Decisive Criterion for Distinguishing Islam from Unbelief). He acknowledges that interpreting religious texts differently does not necessarily constitute disbelief, provided there is sufficient justification for departing from their apparent meaning.

I believe these principles create a relevant question concerning al-Ghazali's accusations toward Avicenna. If Avicenna's ideas represent a philosophical description of how Allah possesses total knowledge without undergoing change, then why must they always be viewed as rejecting religious revelation as opposed to interpreting divine knowledge philosophically?

On the other hand, however, I am aware of the most direct challenge to my reasoning. If Avicenna's description of God's knowledge implies that God does not know what a particular individual did at a particular time, then al-Ghazali's objections become much more serious.

For instance, if God did not know whether a certain individual performed a certain act, then it appears to contradict Quran 34:3, which states that Allah knows all things.

Nonetheless, I do not believe this conclusion is required by Avicenna's philosophy. If Allah knows all the complete causes and conditions for every single individual event, then His knowledge would be inclusive of those events regardless of the nature of His knowledge.

The truth is that describing divine knowledge as universal does not necessarily mean that its objects are confined to universal concepts. Alternatively, Avicenna's account can be interpreted as explaining how Allah knows particular realities through a universal and constant comprehension of their causes.

Thus, I reject al-Ghazali's claim that Avicenna's views on divine knowledge necessarily constitute kufr.

Al-Ghazali must show that Avicenna's philosophy actually denies Allah's knowledge of specific realities rather than simply presenting another philosophical model for understanding divine knowledge.

Ultimately, even if Avicenna's philosophy is flawed, it does not follow that his philosophy necessarily conflicts with a fundamental principle of Islam. Until al-Ghazali demonstrates that Avicenna's conception of divine knowledge inherently excludes the particular knowledge affirmed in revelation, I continue to doubt whether Avicenna's philosophy constitutes kufr.

III. Bodily Resurrection and the Afterlife

Al-Ghazali's Criticism of Avicenna

Bodily resurrection is another area where al-Ghazali objects to the philosophers. Al-Ghazali critiques the philosophers for rejecting the resurrection of the human body. In the twentieth discussion of Tahafut al-Falasifah, or The Incoherence of the Philosophers, al-Ghazali claims that the philosophers deny bodily resurrection. Al-Ghazali believes that this is kufr, or disbelief.

Al-Ghazali argues that religious revelation clearly states that humans are resurrected with both their souls and bodies. As stated in Quran 36:78–79, Allah responds to the question of who can revive decayed bones by declaring that the One who created them in the first place will give them life again. In addition, in Quran 75:3–4, God tells us that He is capable of putting back together the skeletal parts of man, including his fingertips.

Al-Ghazali believes that these verses show that God is capable of bringing the dead back to life. Therefore, al-Ghazali argues that if anyone interprets Quranic references to resurrection of the human body to refer only to a spiritual experience, they are contradicting religious teachings and committing kufr.

What Avicenna Actually Believes

Avicenna believed in the immortality and incorporeality of the rational soul.

In Book IX, Chapter 7 of The Metaphysics of the Healing, Avicenna argues that the soul lives beyond the destruction of the body. According to Avicenna, the greatest source of pleasure is attaining true knowledge of God; conversely, suffering is deprivation of this type of knowledge.

Nevertheless, Avicenna makes an important distinction.

Avicenna asserts that we can know through reason alone that there is a spiritual resurrection. Conversely, he argues that we know through the teachings of the Prophet that there will be a bodily resurrection.

This is crucial.

Avicenna does not dismiss bodily resurrection in Al-Shifa. To the contrary, he affirms it through revelation. Although Avicenna did not philosophically prove the existence of a bodily resurrection in Al-Shifa, he acknowledged the authority of prophetic revelation over the issue.

Nevertheless, in Al-Adhawiyya fi al-Ma'ad (The Treatise on the Afterlife), Avicenna provides several reasons why bodily resurrection cannot occur literally. Thus, in contrast to Al-Shifa, Avicenna's views on resurrection presented in Al-Adhawiyya seem to be more directly critical of literal interpretations.

Therefore, Avicenna's writings create a dilemma. While he affirms the idea of bodily resurrection through prophetic authority in Al-Shifa, his other works provide arguments against the literal interpretation of bodily resurrection.

Historical Responses

Ibn Rushd responds to al-Ghazali's objections in Tahafut al-Tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence). Ibn Rushd explains that a disagreement over the interpretation of the afterlife, rather than a denial of its reality, does not necessarily justify an accusation of kufr.

Furthermore, Ibn Rushd writes in Fasl al-Maqal (The Decisive Treatise) that disagreements over interpretations of resurrection do not necessarily constitute a sufficient basis for an accusation of kufr. Ibn Rushd asks whether there exists a consensus among authorities about every detail of what occurs after death.

Sayyid Ahmad Alawi offers a defense of Avicenna against al-Ghazali's accusation. In his commentary on Al-Shifa, Alawi explores Avicenna's comments on resurrection and argues that his acceptance of prophetic authority supports his position on bodily resurrection.

Another example of someone who was influenced by Avicenna but still advocated for bodily resurrection is Nasir al-Din al-Tusi. Since he accepted much of Avicenna's philosophy but rejected some of his views on the afterlife, al-Tusi's position shows that one may accept many philosophical contributions of a particular thinker yet reject his conclusions on issues related to religion.

Mulla Sadra develops a new philosophical justification for bodily resurrection in Al-Asfar al-Arba'a. Unlike Avicenna, Mulla Sadra argues that bodily resurrection can be rationally demonstrated.

For Mulla Sadra, the soul endures past death and possesses an imaginal body (jism mithali) during the afterlife. For Mulla Sadra, this imaginal body is truly real, but it does not consist of ordinary physical matter. Through this explanation, Mulla Sadra attempts to demonstrate both the immortality of the soul and the reality of bodily resurrection which is asserted in Islamic revelation.

My Response

1. Why I Prefer Mulla Sadra Over Avicenna Regarding Resurrection

Although I defended Avicenna against the first two criticisms made by al-Ghazali (regarding the eternity of the universe and Allah's knowledge of particulars), I am less sympathetic to Avicenna's view on resurrection.

Specifically, I prefer Mulla Sadra's explanation of resurrection.

First, I believe that bodily resurrection is a central doctrine in Islam.

The Quran refers to Allah's power to bring back the dead repeatedly throughout its text (e.g., Quran 36:78–79 and Quran 75:3–4). In light of these clear and direct references to Allah's power to restore life to dead individuals, I do not think these references should be interpreted metaphorically as mere descriptions of spiritual survival.

That being said, recognizing the importance of bodily resurrection as a part of Islamic theology does not force me to conclude that resurrected bodies must have exactly the same material composition as we have now.

I think this is precisely why Mulla Sadra's position is attractive to me.

For Mulla Sadra, after death, the soul continues to exist and has an appropriate kind of body based on the reality of life after death. With respect to my own conception of what kinds of experiences would be possible for a resurrected person, I see no problem with imagining them having experiences consistent with their having an imaginal body, as well as no problem with thinking that an imaginal body could include various types of sensory experience and interactions within space.

Moreover, Quran 23:100 describes an intermediate state (barzakh) between death and resurrection. Of course, this verse does not confirm Mulla Sadra's view regarding the imaginal body; however, it does indicate a distinct state of existence between death and resurrection.

I also find Mulla Sadra's explanation of personal identity to be more reasonable than either Avicenna's or al-Ghazali's. If the soul is what identifies a person continuously throughout history, then preserving that identity does not depend on preserving every single particle making up the original body.

I thus prefer Mulla Sadra's explanation for these reasons: it affirms bodily resurrection and provides a philosophical account of how both the soul and body can endure into the afterlife.

I believe in bodily resurrection and find Mulla Sadra's position more philosophically satisfactory than Avicenna's. However, I do not believe that rejecting Avicenna's account automatically means accepting al-Ghazali's condemnation.

2. Even If Avicenna Was Incorrect in His Views on Resurrection, Does His Doctrine Constitute Kufr?

I realize that this critique represents a far more serious challenge than either of al-Ghazali's other challenges. The Quran explicitly describes bodily resurrection on the Day of Judgment. Denying an explicit teaching of revelation cannot be viewed solely as a difference in opinion over matters involving reason or intellect.

I believe there exists an important distinction between rejecting revelation altogether versus objecting to one's understanding (or misinterpretation) of what revelation teaches.

Avicenna explicitly affirms the immortality of the soul and that rewards and punishments await us after death. More importantly, in Al-Shifa, he recognizes that bodily resurrection is established through prophetic authority.

This is significant because acknowledging that something is revealed through prophecy, regardless of whether it can be shown to exist through reason or not, is not identical to denying a Prophet's trustworthiness.

As noted earlier, al-Ghazali distinguishes between interpretation and flat-out rejection of divine revelation in Faysal al-Tafriqa. However, he does not assume that every interpretative stance is equally valid and considers denial of bodily resurrection to exceed that line.

I recognize that this creates a greater burden for defending Avicenna since his arguments in Al-Adhawiyya strengthen al-Ghazali's case. Several statements by Avicenna appear to reject bodily resurrection as literally understood.

However, this does not render irrelevant his comments in Al-Shifa. The two texts must be read together before determining whether his doctrine constitutes a denial of prophetic truthfulness.

Moreover, Mulla Sadra provides an example of how bodily resurrection can be conceived using a metaphysical structure unlike restoring an ordinary mortal body. Although this does not automatically vindicate Avicenna's position, it does show that philosophical disputes over what resurrection entails do not inherently equal rejecting its occurrence per se.

My point is not that every rejection of bodily resurrection is permissible under Islamic law. If a proposition explicitly denies something that has been definitively taught by the Prophet, then condemning it as kufr becomes more plausible.

Rather, I am questioning whether Avicenna's actual views can be reduced to this kind of denial, especially considering he has explicitly recognized bodily resurrection as revealed by the Prophet in one text.

Thus, I disagree with certain aspects of Avicenna's philosophical views on resurrection, but I remain unpersuaded that his views represent kufr when taken as a whole.

Finally, al-Ghazali must establish that Avicenna's views represent an absolute rejection of the Prophet's teachings, rather than just differing with him over details surrounding interpretations of what transpires in the hereafter.