The Takfīr of Avicenna (Part 2)

By Mohamad Farhat

A Defense of Ibn Sīnā (A Continuation of Part 1)

IV. Divine Necessity and Freedom

Al-Ghazali's Criticism of Avicenna

When analyzing the views of al-Ghazali regarding Avicenna’s ideas about the necessary causality of God, we can discern that al-Ghazali finds fault in Avicenna’s view of freedom or choice. Specifically, in Tahafut al-Falasifah (The Incoherence of the Philosophers), al-Ghazali criticizes Avicenna’s understanding of God’s eternal will.

According to al-Ghazali, true freedom implies an agent capable of exercising will and selecting from alternatives. For al-Ghazali, God's necessary causality negates true divine freedom since God must inevitably create. Therefore, al-Ghazali asserts that such a being cannot be accurately referred to as a creator who acts through will.

God’s will is eternal for al-Ghazali. Thus, He chooses to create at a particular time, yet the will to create does not result in a transformation of God Himself. Al-Ghazali rejects the idea that an eternal cause must necessarily have an eternal effect.

Al-Ghazali believes that the philosophers’ concept of divine causality cannot be compatible with true divine freedom. However, al-Ghazali did not isolate necessitarianism as a fourth doctrine constituting disbelief (kufr). This critique is related to his rejection of the idea of an eternal world.

What Avicenna Actually Believes

Avicenna defines divine freedom in terms of his distinction between necessity and contingency.

In The Metaphysics of the Healing (Books VIII and IX), Avicenna states that Allah is the Necessary Existent. His existence is dependent upon no other thing. All things proceeding from Allah are contingent in themselves; however, each thing must exist due to the fulfillment of the causes required for it.

Avicenna argued that every complete cause will have an effect when the conditions necessary for that effect are present. Since Allah is eternal, unchanging and completely self-sufficient as the ultimate cause of all existing things, His causal activity cannot occur after a period of inactivity.

However, Avicenna does not equate necessity with coercion.

For Avicenna, Allah does not perform an action because there is something outside of Him causing Him to act. Instead, His activities arise from His own essence, knowledge, and will. Moreover, Avicenna does not view Allah as an unconscious, natural cause. Divine causality is associated with Allah's perfect knowledge of Himself and the good order emanating from Him.

Hence, Avicenna distinguishes between acting necessarily in accordance with one's own nature and being coerced by some external agency. The actions of Allah are necessary; however, this necessity arises solely from His own essence, not from anything external.

Historical Responses

One of the greatest defenders of Avicennian causal necessity is Nasir al-Din al-Tusi.

In Treatise on Determinism and Destiny, al-Tusi argues that once all factors contributing to the development of an event are in place, then that event must come into being. However, al-Tusi does not agree that this destroys human volition.

He explains that a person performs an action with voluntary intent when the action occurs as a consequence of that person's will. The fact that the action comes into being as a result of a person's will does not imply that the person is being forced against their will.

Al-Tusi also responds to criticisms regarding accountability and moral behavior; he claims that causal determinism does not eliminate our capacity to praise or condemn individuals, nor does it nullify moral education.

In addition to addressing objections to causal determinism, al-Tusi expands his interpretation of divine causality and freedom in his commentary on Avicenna's Al-Isharat wa al-Tanbihat.

Al-Tusi demonstrates how an eternally causing God can still be considered as willing to act freely. While this may leave room for debate regarding whether this preserves the capability to act differently than is actually done, it is clear that al-Tusi supports the view that Allah's causation is voluntary rather than caused by an external force.

Similarly, Mulla Sadra presents arguments supporting the view that causal determination and voluntary action are not mutually exclusive in Al-Asfar al-Arba'a (The Four Journeys).

Sadra rejects the view that freedom necessarily requires the possession of alternative possibilities. Instead, Sadra argues that an action resulting from an agent's will can be considered voluntary even if it results necessarily from that will, provided that the immediate source of the action is the agent's will.

While Sadra develops a metaphysical framework different from Avicenna's, Sadra agrees with Avicenna that necessity and voluntariness are not logically inconsistent.

My Response

1. Why I Think Avicenna’s Explanation of Divine Freedom Is More Logical

I believe Avicenna’s distinction between necessity and coercion is logical.

To me, there is a large conceptual gap between being required to do something by something outside oneself versus doing something according to one’s own nature and will.

If Allah’s actions arise out of His full knowledge of Himself and His own nature, I don’t think it diminishes Allah’s freedom that His acts of creation follow necessarily from His nature, whether creation is eternal or has a temporal beginning.

Furthermore, I am skeptical that actual freedom requires the ability to act otherwise. Can’t an agent be perfectly knowledgeable and consistent in their actions yet still be totally free? And if so, doesn't this negate the argument that since Allah knows all possible outcomes beforehand (and presumably has chosen accordingly), He is less than fully free?

Al-Ghazali might say that Allah's perfection does not preclude Allah from making a selection among possible options. But this would assume that the ability to select among different options is a prerequisite for freedom, which is exactly what Avicenna contests.

Moreover, Avicenna maintains divine immutability. If Allah's knowledge, will and essence are eternal and remain unchanged, then His causal activity cannot begin at some later time or involve any transition in acquiring an additional intention.

Therefore, I believe Avicenna’s explanation is superior since he makes the crucial distinction between acting necessarily due to one’s own will versus acting under coercion.

2. Even If Avicenna Was Wrong, Would That Make His Necessitarianism Kufr?

Even if I accepted al-Ghazali’s claim that Avicenna was wrong about his view of divine freedom, I do not think this would demonstrate that Avicenna’s necessitarianism constituted disbelief.

The Quran clearly teaches us about Allah’s will and authority. In Quran 85:16, Allah describes Himself as the One who does whatever He wills. In addition, Quran 36:82 declares that when Allah wills something, His command is to say "Be," and it is.

I accept these verses entirely. However, acceptance that Allah wills something does not indicate that divine freedom requires the option of acting otherwise.

It seems obvious to me that Avicenna does not deny Allah's will. Instead, he interprets Allah's will as inseparable from His knowledge and essence. It appears to me that Avicenna’s primary disagreement with al-Ghazali relates to the character of divine freedom rather than whether or not Allah possesses knowledge, will or power.

Clearly, this distinction is critical here, especially since the Quran establishes that Allah acts based upon His will; however, it does not describe specifically what constitutes freedom using the philosophical criterion of having alternative possibilities available.

Obviously, al-Ghazali could reply that Avicenna’s view of necessary causality renders Allah’s will ineffective. However, this would require proving that an action coming into existence due to an agent's will cannot be truly voluntary if it follows necessarily from that will.

I do not believe this has been shown to be the case, as explained by both al-Tusi and Mulla Sadra, since necessity resulting from an agent's own will is distinct from external coercion.

Additionally, al-Ghazali himself makes a distinction between theological error and disbelief in Faysal al-Tafriqa (The Decisive Criterion for Distinguishing Islam from Unbelief).

Specifically, his principles demand distinguishing between denying prophetic truth and interpreting it incorrectly.

This distinction is especially pertinent here, since al-Ghazali identifies three distinct philosophical positions as representing kufr in Tahafut al-Falasifah. However, he did not specifically designate divine necessitarianism as a fourth type of kufr, although it was certainly connected with his rejection of the universe's eternity.

I therefore question what rational basis there could possibly be for determining that Avicenna's view of divine freedom represents kufr.

Since Avicenna accepts Allah as the Necessary Existent, as the ultimate source of all contingent beings, and as a being whose actions arise out of His knowledge and will, his philosophical explanations for these characteristics can obviously be subject to philosophical challenge; however, disagreements about their nature do not necessarily constitute denial of these characteristics.

I recognize that al-Ghazali believes the availability of alternative possibilities is essential for divine freedom. However, I do not feel he has adequately proven that rejecting this specific characterization necessarily conflicts with any essential tenets of Islam.

Therefore, I reject the conclusion that Avicenna's necessitarianism constitutes kufr. Even if I agreed with al-Ghazali that Avicenna's view of divine freedom is philosophically flawed, al-Ghazali would still need to prove that the doctrine necessarily contradicts an essential tenet of Islam, rather than presenting a different understanding of Allah's will and causation.

V. Divine Attributes and Simplicity

Al-Ghazali's Criticism of Avicenna

Al-Ghazali critiques Avicenna concerning his understanding of Allah’s divine attributes. In the sixth discussion of Tahafut al-Falasifah (The Incoherence of the Philosophers), al-Ghazali questions the philosophers’ claim that Allah’s attributes are identical with His essence.

Al-Ghazali believes that Allah has real and eternal attributes, specifically knowledge, power, and will, which are distinct from His essence. He argues that these attributes do not necessarily create plurality or composition in Allah. They have always existed and subsist in Allah’s essence, not independently of Him.

Al-Ghazali finds that Avicenna’s rejection of attributes separate from the divine essence does not provide an adequate representation of Allah’s perfections. Therefore, he disputes the philosophers’ claim that affirming distinct divine attributes would undermine Allah’s absolute unity.

Despite this, however, al-Ghazali does not categorize Avicenna’s doctrine of divine simplicity as kufr. He is critiquing the philosophical basis for Avicenna’s understanding of Allah’s attributes.

What Avicenna Actually Believes

Avicenna bases his theory of divine simplicity on his distinction between necessary and contingent being.

Book VIII of The Metaphysics of the Healing states that the Necessary Existent (Allah) cannot be composed of different parts. Any composite thing depends upon its component parts. However, Allah is absolutely independent and thus cannot rely on anything else.

Therefore, Avicenna concludes that Allah's essence must be completely simple.

Avicenna does not dispute that Allah knows, has power, has will, or possesses life. On the contrary, he denies the idea that Allah has a set of attributes existing in addition to His essence.

To Avicenna, Allah's knowledge, power, and will simply describe one single unified divine reality. While each of these attributes may express different ideas when analyzed using reason alone, they do not represent an actual difference within Allah's essence.

To Avicenna, asserting divine simplicity does not decrease Allah's perfection; it allows Him to remain completely independent from everything else by eliminating any dependency upon something separate from Himself.

Historical Responses

Nasir al-Din al-Tusi develops and defends key aspects of Avicenna's theory of divine simplicity.

In Tajrid al-I'tiqad and his commentary on Avicenna's Al-Isharat wa al-Tanbihat, al-Tusi supports the view that Allah's essential attributes are identical with His essence.

Al-Tusi posits that Allah's knowledge, power, and other essential perfections do not represent distinct elements within Him. His stance upholds the distinction between the different meanings of divine attributes while rejecting any composition within the divine essence.

This stance is also consistent with a key concept in Shia theology: Allah's essential attributes do not add additional reality beyond His essence.

Similarly, Mulla Sadra defends divine simplicity in Al-Asfar al-Arba'a (The Four Journeys).

According to Mulla Sadra, Allah encompasses all perfections at the highest level without having any metaphysical composition. His knowledge, power, and life are not separate entities but are identical in reality with His absolutely simple existence.

While Mulla Sadra builds a metaphysical system differing from Avicenna's primarily in terms of Mulla Sadra's emphasis on the primacy of existence, he also concurs with Avicenna that divine simplicity does not result in the lack of attributes, but instead in their total identification with the divine essence.

My Response

1. Why I Think Avicenna’s View Regarding Divine Simplicity Represents a Stronger Philosophical Position

I think Avicenna provides a stronger philosophical explanation regarding divine simplicity than al-Ghazali does, and on this topic, I agree with the main conclusions of both al-Tusi and Mulla Sadra.

Primarily, I believe that composition entails dependence. If Allah were comprised of many disparate parts within His essence, His very existence would depend on them.

Given that Allah is the Necessary Existent, I believe that it logically follows that Allah must be totally devoid of all forms of composition.

Additionally, I am uncertain whether describing Allah as knowledgeable, powerful, or willing requires that His knowledge, power, and will exist as separate realities from His essence.

It is possible for Allah to be described by means of multiple attributes without necessitating that these attributes have an existence separate from His essence. Regardless of how we describe Allah via multiple attributes, we can distinguish between the different meanings of these attributes based on how we analyze them intellectually; there is no requirement for us to infer differences within Allah.

Moreover, I believe that I have considerable justification for believing so within Islamic teachings themselves.

The Quran says in Surah 112:1 that Allah is One. Also, in Surah 42:11, it indicates that nothing resembles Allah. These passages do not directly establish Avicenna's entire metaphysical system, but they appear to me compatible with his notion of absolute unity.

Perhaps even more relevant is a statement attributed to Imam Ali in Sermon 1 of Nahj al-Balagha.

Imam Ali links the completeness of tawhid with denying attributes understood as distinct from the divine essence. He points out that an attribute considered apart from what it describes represents a separation between them.

I find this particular point significant. It represents an explanation of tawhid similar to Avicenna's denial of attributes existing as additional realities alongside Allah's essence.

Of course, Imam Ali's statement does not mean that he denies the divine attributes affirmed by revelation. Rather, it appears to reject the idea that those attributes exist separately from Allah's essence.

This is consistent with views held by both al-Tusi and Mulla Sadra.

I therefore believe that Avicenna's perspective is stronger because it preserves Allah's unity, necessity, and independence without diminishing any of His perfect attributes.

2. Even If Avicenna Is Wrong, Does His Doctrine Constitute Kufr?

Even if I granted al-Ghazali's argument that Avicenna's theory of divine simplicity is philosophically incorrect, I still do not think this would justify labeling his theory as kufr.

The Quran explicitly affirms that Allah possesses knowledge, power, and will. Nevertheless, affirming these attributes does not necessarily prove that they must exist as separate realities from Allah's essence.

A primary distinction lies between denying that Allah possesses divine attributes and denying that those attributes exist separately from Allah's essence.

Avicenna never denies that Allah possesses knowledge, power, or will. Instead, he considers these attributes as identical with Allah's essence.

This distinction becomes extremely important when evaluating the theological views of Imam Ali in Nahj al-Balagha.

If rejecting attributes as separate from Allah's essence constituted kufr, how would we interpret Imam Ali's statements about divine unity?

I don't believe we can dismiss a doctrine similar to an accepted interpretation of Imam Ali's teachings as kufr merely because it differs from al-Ghazali's theological framework.

Moreover, al-Tusi and Mulla Sadra, two prominent thinkers in the Shia intellectual tradition, defend the identity of Allah's essential attributes with His essence. This demonstrates that Avicenna's viewpoint on divine simplicity is far from being an isolated philosophical concept lacking roots within Islamic scholarship.

VI. Emanation and the Intellects

Al-Ghazali's Criticism of Avicenna

Al-Ghazali criticized Avicenna's concept of emanation in Tahafut al-Falasifah (The Incoherence of the Philosophers), particularly the third discussion of the book. Al-Ghazali attacked the philosophers' understanding of how Allah produced the universe through a series of intellects.

According to Avicenna, the reason that Allah can produce only one immediate effect is that from one, insofar as it is one, only one can proceed. Thus, according to Avicenna, Allah produces the First Intellect alone. The First Intellect gives rise to further intellects and the rest of the world.

Al-Ghazali questions the reasoning behind why a single cause cannot create multiple immediate effects. Additionally, al-Ghazali disputes the philosophers' explanations about how multiple effects come from the First Intellect since the philosophers use the principle of unity as the basis for their explanation.

Finally, al-Ghazali argues that Avicenna's theory takes away from Allah's ability to be seen as truly the Creator by substituting Allah's voluntary act of creation with necessary causal relationships.

But al-Ghazali did not identify Avicenna's theory of emanation as kufr on its own. Al-Ghazali was attacking Avicenna's theory primarily as a part of his broader attacks against philosophical ideas concerning God's creative activity and necessary causation.

What Avicenna Actually Believes

In Book IX, Chapter 4 of The Metaphysics of the Healing, Avicenna explains his theory of emanation (fayd).

Avicenna says that Allah is totally simple. Because of this, no composition can exist within Him. Only one immediate effect may therefore proceed from Him. This immediate effect is, for Avicenna, the First Intellect.

The First Intellect knows Allah and itself. Through its different intellectual considerations, additional intellects and heavenly bodies arise until we reach the Active Intellect, which plays a large role in producing our earthly reality.

Traditionally, Avicenna's system consisted of ten intellects. They reflect the astronomy present during Avicenna's time. However, Avicenna does not see the intellects as independent creators. Instead, each intellect exists contingently in itself and has its existence derived from Allah.

Thus, even though intermediate causes are present in Avicenna's system, they do not take away from Allah's status as the ultimate source of all existence. For Avicenna, emanation is a hierarchical structure of existence. Every stage of existence is contingent upon the Necessary Existent.

Historical Responses

Al-Tusi provided a defense for many aspects of Avicenna's central ideas relating to emanation in his commentary on Al-Isharat wa al-Tanbihat.

Al-Tusi maintained a sharp distinction between the Necessary Existent and the contingent intellects that proceed from Him. Although the contingent intellects are intermediate causes, none possess existence independently of Allah.

This allowed al-Tusi to preserve Avicenna's notion of divine simplicity while also giving a means to explain the variety in creation through intermediate dependent causes.

Mulla Sadra explained emanation in Al-Asfar al-Arba'a (The Four Journeys). Nevertheless, Mulla Sadra employed his own notions of the primacy and gradation of existence to explain the relation between Allah and creation. According to Mulla Sadra, created entities have differing degrees of existence; however, all degrees of existence depend upon Allah.

Although Mulla Sadra's metaphysics diverges from Avicenna's strict cosmological hierarchy in numerous ways, both held that all contingent existence ultimately depends upon Allah and does not exist independently of Him.

My Response

1. Why I Believe Avicenna's Theory of Emanation Is Philosophically Sound

Fundamentally, I find that Avicenna's description of emanation provides an attractive philosophy for several reasons.

Firstly, I think Avicenna successfully distinguishes between intermediate causes and ultimate causes of existence.

I do not know why something should automatically become an independent creator just because it functions as an intermediate cause. If all contingent existence ultimately derives from Allah, and if all existence that proceeds from the First Intellect ultimately derives from Allah, then all causes in Avicenna's system are contingent upon Allah.

Secondly, I realize that Avicenna made an attempt to give an explanation for how multiplicity emerges from an absolutely simple being without adding any complexity to His essence. Although I acknowledge al-Ghazali's argument that the principle of one immediate effect has not been conclusively demonstrated, I believe Avicenna's overall account of dependent causality has merit as a philosophy.

Thirdly, I distinguish my agreement with Avicenna's metaphysical principles from my agreement with every detail in Avicenna's cosmology. Specifically, Avicenna presents us with a hierarchy of ten intellects that reflects an astronomical model from Avicenna's era and which I do not feel obligated to endorse.

Therefore, I concur with Avicenna, al-Tusi, and Mulla Sadra that intermediary causes do not reduce Allah to secondary status as the ultimate cause of all existence.

2. Even If Avicenna Is Wrong, Does His Doctrine Constitute Kufr?

Even if Avicenna was wrong on a philosophical level, I do not think it would mean that his theory of emanation constitutes kufr.

Quran 39:62 states that Allah is the Creator of all things, and I agree with this entirely. The affirmation of Allah as the Creator does not mean each created thing must have come into being directly from Allah. It also does not imply that there are no intermediary agents operating under His authority.

In fact, the Quran recognizes such agents. For example, Quran 39:42 states that Allah is responsible for taking souls when humans die. In contrast, Quran 32:11 states that it is the angel of death that takes souls. Both of these verses show that actions attributed to Allah can be carried out by other agents acting under His authority.

Thus, the use of intermediate causes does not necessarily contradict the concept of monotheism. Moreover, Avicenna did not give separate divine status to his intermediate intellects. Rather, he said that they exist and cause because of Allah.

I acknowledge that al-Ghazali could claim that Avicenna's principle of emanation limits Allah's sovereignty since only one direct effect can proceed from Him. But first, al-Ghazali has to prove that Avicenna's theory of emanation contradicts Islam based on scriptural evidence, rather than merely establishing that Avicenna's philosophical explanation is incorrect. Second, in Faysal al-Tafriqa, al-Ghazali made a distinction between theological errors and disbelief. And in Tahafut al-Falasifah, he did not identify emanation as one of the three doctrines constituting disbelief (kufr).

Therefore, I reject claims that Avicenna's theory of emanation constitutes kufr.

VII. Scholars Who Defended and Praised Ibn Sina

Despite the accusations of disbelief directed against Ibn Sina, numerous Muslim scholars defended his philosophy, praised his intellectual achievements, and developed his ideas. Six scholars are particularly relevant.

Nasir al-Din al-Tusi (1201–1274)

One of Ibn Sina's most prominent defenders. In Sharh al-Isharat, al-Tusi defended Ibn Sina against criticisms raised by Fakhr al-Din al-Razi. He supported major aspects of his metaphysics, including divine simplicity, necessity, and causation.

Mulla Sadra (c. 1571–1640)

One of the most influential Shia philosophers, Mulla Sadra developed numerous aspects of Ibn Sina's philosophy in Al-Asfar al-Arba'a. Although he disagreed with Ibn Sina on issues such as bodily resurrection, he preserved and expanded his arguments concerning divine simplicity, causation, and necessary existence.

Sayyid Ahmad Alawi (17th century)

A Shia philosopher who defended Ibn Sina against accusations concerning bodily resurrection. In his commentary on Al-Shifa, Alawi emphasized Ibn Sina's acknowledgment of bodily resurrection through prophetic revelation, challenging the claim that he simply rejected Islamic teachings about the afterlife.

Ibn Rushd (1126–1198)

Although Ibn Rushd disagreed with several of Ibn Sina's philosophical doctrines, he defended the philosophical tradition against al-Ghazali's criticisms in Tahafut al-Tahafut. He challenged the justification for declaring philosophers disbelievers over disputed philosophical interpretations.

Umar Khayyam (1048–1131)

A mathematician and philosopher who admired Ibn Sina and adopted important elements of his metaphysics. Khayyam regarded Ibn Sina as a major philosophical authority and developed ideas concerning necessary existence, causation, and divine unity.

Sayf al-Din al-Amidi (1156–1233)

A Sunni theologian and philosopher who directly challenged Fakhr al-Din al-Razi's criticisms of Ibn Sina. In Kashf al-Tamwihat, al-Amidi responded to al-Razi's commentary on Al-Isharat wa al-Tanbihat, defending several of Ibn Sina's philosophical arguments and disputing objections raised against them. Although he did not agree with every Avicennian doctrine, his work represents an important historical response to Ibn Sina's critics.